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Abstract 
Intermitted Water Supply strategy is implemented commonly in some 
developing countries nowadays in order to minimize the water scarcity 
problems. Unstable hydraulic conditions in the distribution system, low 
pressure, high risk of water contamination, wasting water, rising costs paid by 
consumers and water providers, failures and problems with consumption 
metering and inconvenience to consumers are some of the consequences. 
Risk Analysis Methodology is developed to handle with intermittent water 
supply systems in developing countries conditions that include undesired 
events identification; risk estimation and risk evaluation and reduction plan, the 
catalogue list of potential undesired events (UE) which may occur in these 
types of systems have been also developed using the HAZard and OPerability 
technique (HAZOP).  
The developed methodology is implemented and tested in this research on one 
of the potential undesired events UE _ Low operational pressure  
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Abstrakt 
Systémy s přerušovanou dodávkou vody jsou dnes běžně realizovány 
v některých rozvojových zemích a to z důvodu minimalizace problémů 
způsobených nedostatkem vody. Proměnlivé hydraulické podmínky 
v distribučních systémech, nízké tlaky, vysoké riziko kontaminace, plýtvání 
vodou, nárůst cen, které platí spotřebitelé a poskytovatelé vody, poruchy a 
problémy při měření spotřeby vody a nepříjemnosti pro spotřebitele s tím 
spojené, to jsou některé důsledky provozování takovýchto systémů. Za použití 
Studie nebezpečí a provozuschopnosti HAZOP (HAZard and OPerability 
technique) byla vyvinuta metodika rizikové analýzy pro systémy s přerušovanou 
dodávkou vody a byl vytvořen katalogový seznam potenciálních nežádoucích 
stavů (NS), které mohou nastat v systému tohoto typu. V této práci je také 
popsáno použití rozvinuté metodiky a Analýzy stromu poruchových stavů FTA 
(Fault Tree Analysis), která je použita k analýze pravděpodobností a důsledků 
včetně ohodnocení stupně rizika s nejistotou pro jeden z nežádoucích stavů 
NS_Nízký provozní tlak  
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 1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of a Water Supply System (WSS) is to make water available to customers 
with at least acceptable pressure, flow, continuity and water quality. 
WSS consists of the following main sub-systems: 
1. Water sources, which could be 
1.1 Surface water sources and/or 
1.2 Ground water sources 
2. Treatment plant 
3. Water distribution system, which generally consists of 
3.1 Main water tank (reservoir); 
3.2 Transmission mains; 
3.3 Pumping system; 
3.4 Water supply network 
Usually, drinking water supply systems are designed and operated on continuous 
pattern for twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week, continuous water system 
(CWS). 
Any sub-system quantity failures i.e. no water is delivered to the consumers or quality 
failures i.e. water is delivered but unfit for human consumption according to water 
quality standards, may cause system supply failure, in developing countries frequent 
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interruption in water supply is acceptable while in developed countries only temporary 
emergency interruption in water supply is allowed. 
 Statement of the problem  1.1
The available surface and ground water sources throughout the world are becoming 
depleted or polluted; this problem is aggravated by the rate of increasing in 
populations, rapid urbanization, and increasing in domestic, public, and industrial water 
demand, the previous problems make it difficult to supply water systems with sufficient 
quantity of water with acceptable quality, especially in developing countries where is no 
sufficient technical, financial and/or technological ability to find out new water sources, 
desalinate available sea water or to treat the available raw water. 
There are two major views on how insufficient water sources problem should be 
considered; the first view looks at a transfer to 24-hour supply by reducing water loss 
and adding new supply sources, while the other accepts intermittent supply as a reality 
(1). 
In some developing countries, due to financial and technological constraints it is not 
practically possible to operate water supply systems for twenty-four hours a day even if 
the water is available, generally a period of eight hours or less is considered adequate 
to supply, so the water utilities transfer the operation from continuous into intermittent 
strategy. 
Intermittent water supply (IWS) strategy is to provide water to the distribution network 
less than 24 hours a day and/or less than 7 days a week, most water distribution 
systems all around the world are designed and modeled with continuous supply pattern 
then the water utilities may transfer it into intermittent due to the constraints and 
problems that are mentioned before, IWS strategy is acceptable in most of the 
developing countries and is not acceptable in the developed countries. 
In IWS systems, the consumers depend on individual roof and /or ground storage tanks 
to provide their daily needs of water for domestic, industrial, and other uses. This 
means that the consumption of water is not necessarily provided from the network 
directly, but may be provided from the storage system, in this case the consumption of 
water is not restricted only by the pressure that is available in the distribution network, 
but also they are restricted by the capacity of the storage tanks. 
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From the hydraulic point of view, when the consumers are using the water from their 
roof tanks, they are disconnected from the distribution system, and two independent 
patterns can be distinguished in this case:  
The first pattern is at the consumer‟s tap which is actually a consumption pattern. 
The second pattern is at the tank which is actually a filling pattern, 
Intermittent water supply system (IWS) is a distribution system with unstable hydraulic 
conditions (2),  
1. The distribution network is not fully pressurized pipeline network but a network 
with very low pressures,  
2. It is a network with restricted water supply hours per day,  
3. Inequitable distribution of the available water, 
4. Thousands of roof tank connections,  
5. Associated with high level of water contamination,  
6. In case of fire, unavailable immediate supply. 
7. Meter malfunctioning and  
8. Inconvenience to consumers. 
Low pressure in IWS systems has high effect on the other problems, it causes meter 
malfunctioning, failure in firefighting systems, water contamination and it forces the 
consumers to use individual household pumping systems to be able to reach the water 
during supply period. 
Because of the zero or low pressure in IWS network, there are two types of backflow 
that may occur. The first is back-siphon age, which occurs when the pressure drops 
sufficiently to cause a vacuum effect in the pipe, which can then draw in contaminants 
through leaks in the pipes or through cross-connections which are any connections 
between a potable drinking water supply and a non-potable, undesirable, polluted or 
contaminated source (3) 
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 Objectives of the thesis 1.2
A number of studies were carried out to describe IWS systems, identify and estimate 
the health risks of such a kind of systems for humans, study the water quality and the 
contamination problems, and to suggest approaches and combinations of software 
programs to model IWS networks. 
In Institute of Municipal Water Management / BUT Czech Republic, WaterRisk project 
was carried out during 2006-2010; Risk Analysis methodology and software tool were 
set to identify, assess, and rank the weaknesses and shortcomings of an existing water 
supply system as a first step of risk management of that system, continuous water 
supply systems are considered under this methodology and the intermittent water 
supply was inserted as an Undesired Event (UE) in the Undesired Events list (4). 
The first objective of the thesis is to develop risk analysis methodology to handle with 
intermittent water supply systems in developing countries conditions that includes 
undesired events identification; risk estimation, risk evaluation and reduction plan. 
The second objective is to implement the developed methodology on one potential 
undesired event, the studied UE in the thesis is UE_ Low operational pressure, which 
was chosen because of its high effect on the other failures and problems in the system, 
low pressure may occur because of the high rate of water withdraw from a limited 
capacity network in a short period, so hydrodynamic operational pressure will decrease 
under its designed values or because of low supplied pressure in main transmission.  
 Undesired event (UE) identification 
UEs identification considers quality, operational, technical and technological UEs that 
may happen in the system and financial, healthy and social UEs that may impact the 
customers;  
For potential UEs identification process and catalogue list setting, the proposed 
methodology employed HAZard and Operability (HAZOP) technique. 
According to HAZOP technique, we divided the studied subsystem into four study 
nodes, for each node we determined parameters, indicators and guide words to 
prepare HAZOP documents, draw the possible scenarios and then set the potential 
undesired events that may occur in the system by determining the deviations from 
standard operating conditions, the documents were set depending on reading, brain 
storming, discussions with experts and on academic and theoretical information. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION  
 ____________________________________________________________________  
 
VUT, 2014  11 
 
 Risk estimation 
It is the estimation procedures of the probabilities of occurrence, the consequences 
and the risk levels for each UE in the system under uncertainty 
For risk estimation, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) technique with specific criteria was 
employed. 
FTA„s diagram displays the interrelationships between a potential top event in a system 
and the causes of this event (Basic events). A properly constructed fault tree provides 
a good illustration of the various combinations of (component) technical failures, 
human errors, normal events, and environmental factors that may result in a critical 
event for the system (5). 
Fault tree should be constructed due to circumstances of the actual system instead of 
being fitted to actual data, then when hard data is missing or insufficient, expert 
judgments must be used (6) 
We should consider entire system from source to tap during analysis because of 
1. Interactions between subsystems 
2. Failure maybe compensated by other subsystem 
I used FTA to analyze probabilities under uncertainty and then to estimate risk level for 
undesired event. 
Probabilities estimation for FTA diagram were modeled and performed with Monte-
Carlo simulation in the case of available hard data, and by Dempster-Shafer theory 
(evidence theory) depending on experts‟ judgments and knowledge in the case of 
unavailable hard data. 
 Risk evaluation and Risk reduction: 
It determines the acceptable risk levels and suggest measures and risk reduction 
options by changing and affecting in the potential causes of the UE in two ways: hard 
measures (control and mitigation) and soft measures (regulations & policies). 
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 Thesis outline 1.3
The thesis is organized into the following main chapters: 
 State of the Art outlines the researches that carried out about IWS systems, 
presents the limitations and gaps in these researches and reviews the used 
methods and techniques in the thesis to analyze and estimate risk levels in IWS 
systems. Chapter 2 
 Basic structure of the proposed methodology that presents the theoretical 
foundations and principles to understand and deal with risk analysis in 
intermittent water supply systems in developing countries conditions. Chapter 3 
 Case Study describes the implementation of the theoretical methodology that 
we detailed in chapter 3 on a simulated case study. Chapter 4 
 Conclusions and discussions summarize research observations. Chapter 5  
2 THE STATE OF THE ART
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 2 THE STATE OF THE ART 
This section presents the definition of an Intermittent Water Supply (IWS), gives an 
overview of the state of the art and the history of the studies and researches that 
carried out in its field. 
It also outlines the most familiar water risk projects; undesired events identification 
techniques, risk level estimation methods and then it gives more details about the 
used techniques in this research.  
 Overview of Intermittent Water Supply (IWS) 2.1
Drinking water supply systems are designed and operated with continuous pattern 
for twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week to cover customers water 
demand, firefighting system demand, in developing countries it is not practically 
possible to operate drinking water systems as a continuous pattern, due to many 
reasons (7): 
 Insufficient quantity of the water sources, 
 Unacceptable quality of available water, 
 Financial problems or 
 Technical and/or technological problems in the system. 
Rationing in general is the controlled distribution of scarce resources, goods, or 
services. Rationing controls the size of the ration, the allowed portion of the 
resources being distributed on a particular day or at a particular time, rationing of 
food and water may become necessary during an emergency, such as a natural 
disaster or during wars. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has 
established guidelines for civilians on rationing food and water supplies. According 
to FEMA standards (8), every person should have a minimum of one quart (1 liter) 
per day of water, and more for children, nursing mothers, and the ill. 
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The governments in developing countries have put in place an emergency strategy 
because of one or more of the previous mentioned reasons, so they rationing their 
energy and/or water sources, each country has its particular rationing plan 
according to specific case, for example the Jordanian government reduces the 
amount of water pumped to households: water would be rationed with each house 
getting it once or twice a week, for three to five hours at a time. 
Water rationing called Intermittent Water Supply (IWS) Fig.1. Generally, a period of 
eight hours or less is considered adequate to supply the network with drinking 
water. 
Intermittent supply strategy can vary according to season in some countries; in 
Damascus for example the frequent interruptions in water supply particularly occur 
in summer. 
 
Fig 1 IWS pattern 
IWS system is a distribution system with unstable hydraulic conditions, it is not fully 
pressurized pipeline network but a network with very low pressures, with restricted 
water supply hours per day, thousands of roof tank connections, high possibilities of 
water contamination, meter malfunctioning and inconvenience to consumers (2). 
From hydraulic behavior side, continuous water distribution network is normally 
“demand-driven “network, while intermittent network is “supply-driven” and 
“pressure-driven” network (1). 
The complexity in intermittent supply and pressure contributes in distribution system 
failures and decrease health status. 
In IWS systems, the consumers depend on individual roof and /or ground storage 
tanks to provide their daily needs of water for domestic uses and depend on 
household pumps to meet the required pressure. During non-supply hours, pipes 
are empty and polluted water enters into the pipelines at vulnerable spots then 
water becomes contaminated and large doses of chlorine or other disinfectants are 
required to make water safe from microbial pollution. The valves suffer wear and 
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tear, inconvenient supply hours affect poor people, large size of storage is required 
and so many other failures are been met (9). 
We can clearly notice that the daily water supply cannot meet the daily water 
demand Fig .2.  
Hourly water demand: 
                       1 
Where 
    is the flow in a specific time (l/hour); 
      is the hourly peak factor; 
        is the average hourly flow in the water system (l/hour) 
                    2 
where 
   is the average demand rate per person (l/hour/person) 
   is the number of customers (person) 
In Syria for instance, the average demand rate         l/hour/person, and the 
average daily consumption is between 50 – 160 l/day/person. 
 
Fig. 2 Daily water demand vs. Daily water supply patterns 
Water demand from the network in IWS systems during supply period consists of 
two amounts of water, one is to meet the consumers demand and the other is to fill 
the households‟ tanks, the customers meet water deficit, which is clear in the chart, 
from private water sources by tanker trucks, Fig.3 
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Fig. 3 Water demand from the network during supply period 
In IWS systems, consumers consume water from the network Fig.3 during supply 
period and from the households‟ tanks Fig.4 during interruption period. 
 
Fig. 4 Daily water consumption from the household tank 
So many studies were carried out to describe IWS systems, suggest methods and 
approach to model this kind of systems, identify and estimate the health risks for 
humans, study the water quality and the contamination problems, and to compare 
Intermittent with Continuous water supply systems. 
Only in developing countries, IWS strategy is acceptable while in developed 
countries it is not acceptable so that it is considered as an UE that relate to 
distribution system‟s section in the catalogue of UEs under WaterRisk project in 
Czech Republic, 2010 (4); only temporary emergency interruption in supply is 
allowed. 
In Latin America and the Caribbean (PAHO & WHO 2001), it is estimated that 60% 
of the population is served by household connections having intermittent service. 
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In Africa and Asia (WHO and UNICEF 2000), it is estimated that more than one-
third and one-half of urban water supplies, respectively, operate intermittently. 
An intermittent supply has been associated with increased water use and wastage 
compared with a continuous supply, wastage occurs because taps are left on owing 
to inconsistency or lack of predictability of when the next water supply will arrive, 
and thus each household attempts to draw a maximum quantity during supply hours 
(10).  
The construction of individual pumps and tanks further reduces the pressure and 
supply of water available to other consumers and complicating the hydraulics of the 
system (10). 
A comparison between performance of water distribution systems during 
intermittent versus during continuous was studied for four Indian cities during 2007, 
both water modes were studied to collect data about water consumption, pressures 
at various points in the network, flow rate and variation, total flow into the network 
and water quality (11). 
Generally we can notice that, the peak factors of demand for IWS are higher than 
peak factors for CWS 
Table.1. presents study‟s results; there are differences in pressure, consumption, 
supply and average flow (11) 
Table 1   Subhash and Prakash study results (11) 
 
Moreover, continuous water systems are safer than intermittent systems in human 
health field, in a sample of four different cities; all 48- 100% samples were negative 
for fecal coliforms during continuous supply versus 24 – 73 % were negative during 
intermittent supply (11). 
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In other different Indian zones, nearly all (90–100%) samples were negative for 
fecal coliforms during continuous service, while only 24–73% was negative during 
intermittent supply (12). 
Interrupted service has also been linked to a number of disease outbreaks in the 
developing world, in Jakarta, Indonesia, poor reliability of the water supply was 
most strongly associated with diarrheal illness (13). 
In Beirut, a study was conducted over an eight-month period, during which samples 
were collected from household tanks and drinking water taps of Beirut's network, 
the study shows that IWS seriously affects water quality due to the potential suction 
of non-potable water by negative pressures, biofilm detachment, and microbial re-
growth especially when static conditions occur; also it focused on storage tanks 
which often encourage bacterial re-growth (14), (15). 
IWS systems are unique in it, so many factors make it different from CWS systems 
such as initial network charging, pressure-dependent water demand, pressure 
design, application of peak factors, changing resistance coefficients, equitable 
water distribution using zoning valves, leakages ...etc. so it needs different 
approach for modeling. 
To model IWS systems, Cabrera and Tyatchkov (1) proposed method to use known 
free public domain network models, such as SWMM for modeling initial pipe 
network charging and EPANET for modeling the intermittent distribution network 
with roof tanks. 
In other study, EPANET source code was adjusted to allow for modeling pressure 
dependent demands, for dealing with low pressure and “dry pipe” situations. A 
configurable tool was developed for incorporating roof tanks into the water supply 
analysis and for better formulation and schematization of the system hydraulics (2) 
A comparative study of existing town in northern India is presented for the design of 
new water supply system using present design practices and a proposed design 
method. The attempt has been made using “EPANET” software and it suggested 
new method that is more practical and realistic for the design of intermittent drinking 
water systems (16) 
IWS„s previous studies and researches lack any direct study considering risk 
analysis 
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 Overview of Risk Analysis Projects and techniques: 2.2
A wide variety of different methods exists and many projects were carried out in risk 
analysis in water supply field. 
In the following section, several Water Risk Analysis projects; Hazard Identification 
methods and Risk Estimation techniques are described: 
2.2.1 Water Risk Analysis projects 
2.2.1.1 WaterRisk project 
WaterRisk project has been carried out by Institute of Municipal Water Management 
/ BUT; Local water supply Utility and National Institute of Public Health in Czech 
Republic during 2006-2010. 
The project developed Risk Analysis methodology and a software tool in the frame 
of the HACCP methodology (Hazard Analysis at Critical Control Points) to achieve 
high level of drinking water quality and safety, the developed methodology has 
been continuously consulted with water utility operators and implemented on some 
real water-supply systems with continuous supply patterns in Czech Republic (4) 
In WaterRisk project, Risk Analysis methodology (RA) is defined as a systematic 
pre-defined process to identify, assess, and rank the weaknesses and 
shortcomings of an existing water supply system as a first step of risk management 
of that system. Hazards that may either affect water quality or interrupt the service 
and the undesired events that are consequences of the hazards are been specially 
focused on, Risk Analysis tries to answer the following three principal questions (4) 
 What can go wrong?   (UE) 
 How likely is it?  (Probability or frequency analysis) 
 What are the consequences?  (Consequence analysis) 
Risk is defined as a combination of the frequency, or probability, of occurrence and 
the consequence of an undesired event, that definition is expressed in the Equ.3. 
     
          3 
Where 
R is the risk level, 
P  is the probability of occurrence of the UE, 
C is the criticality (the consequence). 
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According to RA methodology, water supply system should first be described, 
decomposed into its components according to components catalogue, identified if it 
is simple or complex system and then to be analyzed. 
 
 
Fig. 5 Generic framework of risk analysis of water supply system- WaterRisk (4) 
2.2.1.2 Technology Enable Universal Access to safe water (TECHNEAU) 
project: 
TECHNEAU (2006-2010), an integrated project funded by the European 
Commission, challenges the ability of traditional system and technology solutions 
for drinking water supply to cope with present and future global threats and 
opportunities.  
TECHNEAU develops tools and methods applicable for water utilities to relate the 
risk analysis methods for relevant decisions with respect to risk in the water supply 
system (5) 
Risk Assessment and Risk Management in TECHNEAU project is to integrate risk 
assessments of the separate parts in drinking water supplies into a comprehensive 
decision support framework for cost-efficient risk management in safe and 
sustainable drinking water supply. The framework should be regarded as a 
structure and toolbox for risk assessment and risk management in Water Safety 
Plan. It should be applicable to both groundwater and surface water supply 
systems, with basic as well as more complex designs. The framework should also 
be applicable on both the operational and strategic levels. (5) 
Input data 
System 
description 
Questionnaire 
 
Catalogue of 
hazards and 
risk 
influencing 
actors Database of 
WSS 
elements 
Catalogue of 
undesired 
events 
Frequency 
analysis 
Consequence
s analysis 
Undesired 
events 
R = P . C 
Risk 
Influencing 
Factors 
Vulnerability 
Database of risk 
reducing 
measures 
Hazard  
And 
Undesired 
Events 
identification 
Risk 
estimation 
Risk 
evaluation 
Risk 
reduction 
2 THE STATE OF THE ART
 _________________________________________________________________________  
 
VUT, 2014  21 
 
 
Fig. 6 Generic framework of Risk Management of WSS – TECHNEAU (5) 
The framework provides: 
 Principles for good risk management practice 
 The relevant set of tools necessary for performing the risk assessment and 
management 
 Description of these tools, e.g.: TECHNEAU Hazard database, THDB; Risk 
analysis methods description; TECHNEAU Risk reduction options database, 
TRDB and Decision support tool 
 Clear examples of risk assessment applications and testing of these tools 
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2.2.1.3 Failure Experience Improvement System (FEIS) 
FEIS is a system founded by the Austrian program for security research 2012, the 
purpose of it is to build cause-effect chains network for the water supply system, 
analysis this network in order to support the decision-making by importance-ranking 
the failures, minimizing that failures, exchange experiences … etc. 
There is a high potential to prevent future failures by failure analysis and by sharing 
failure experiences with others. 
FEIS flow diagram: 
Sector  Category  Part  Event (failure events). 
For every failure there are some causes and effects, each effect considered as a 
new failure Fig.7.  
 
The causes 
 
The failure 
 
 
The effects 
 
Fig. 7 Cause-effect chain – FEIS (17) 
By this way we will have a network of cause-effect chains, in this network we can 
calculate the vulnerability and determine the critical failure pathway in the water 
supply infrastructure (17). 
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2.2.2 Hazard identification techniques 
2.2.2.1 HAZard IDentification Analysis (HAZID) 
HAZID is a collection of techniques and methods to identify the hazards in the 
system, such as: 
 What-If analysis: 
The team asks questions beginning with “What- if”, through this questioning 
process, an experienced group of personnel identifies possible hazards or accident 
scenarios. 
 Checklist: 
A checklist is easy to use and is a cost-effective way to identify common and 
customarily recognized hazards (IEC, 1995; USDOE, 2004). 
 Crawford slip: 
It is a method to collect ideas from a large group of people, depending on giving out 
sets of paper slips to everyone in the group and ask them to write one idea per slip 
about a specific topic. 
 Experience from the past. 
2.2.2.2 HAZard OPerability Analysis technique (HAZOP) 
HAZOP technique is a Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) technique used worldwide 
for studying not only the hazards of a system, but also its operability problems, by 
exploring the effects of any deviations from design conditions. (18); (19) 
HAZOP technique was developed in the early 1970s at Imperial Chemical 
Industries (ICI) in UK. 
In the beginning, the studies were called operability studies, they were based on the 
assumption that a problem can only arise when there is a deviation from what is 
normally expected (20). 
Many authors attempted to extend the HAZOP application from identifying hazards 
to evaluate their impacts, HAZOP and FTA considered as the best PHA 
combination of techniques to do so (21) 
Bendixen (22) confirmed that HAZOP-FTA combination was the most effective way 
to identify, quantify, and control risks. They believed that HAZOP is the most 
versatile technique for hazard identification in new and existing facilities, and that 
FTA is the most appropriate hazard-quantification technique. 
Nolan (18) provided in his publication guidance to HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) 
and What-If review teams associated with the petroleum, petrochemical and 
chemical industries. 
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Schurman and Fleger (23) proposed a novel method for incorporating analysis of 
hazards introduced by human error into standard HAZOP by adding a new set of 
guidewords (such as missing, mistimed) and parameters (person, information, 
action) to focus on management and organizational factors that can contribute to 
the risk. 
Khan and Abbasi (24) have proposed an optimum HAZOP study procedure that 
uses expert system and proper management of some of the key steps. This 
procedure is optimal in terms of duration of study, effectiveness and reliability of the 
results. 
Pátkai (25) considered the need for a data-management tool for aiding the HAZOP 
process. He justified the tools and methods by generating more structured data, 
and collecting it for additional developments. Thus, safety experts could utilize the 
tool for HAZOP data-management and not only represent data intuitively, but 
search for important information from the analysis. 
A functional HAZOP assistant is proposed and investigated in a HAZOP study at 
Technical University of Denmark-Chemical and Biochemical Engineering, functional 
HAZOP methodology lends itself directly for implementation into a computer aided 
reasoning tool to perform root cause and consequence analysis (26). 
Executing the method relies on using guidewords (such as, no, more, less) 
combined with process variables - parameters (e.g., Total and fecal coliforms, flow, 
pressure) that aim to reveal deviations (such as: less pressure than, more PH than) 
of the process intention or normal operation. This procedure is applied in a 
particular node as a part of the system characterized for a nominal intention of the 
operative parameters (27) 
The guidewords and process variables should be combined in such a way that they 
lead to meaningful process variable deviations. Hence, all guide words cannot be 
applied to all process variables (24). 
HAZOP analysis process is executed in three phases as illustrated below (28)  
1. Definition Phase 
 Preliminary identification of risk assessment team members,  
 Identify the assessment scope: The risk assessment team must define study 
boundaries and key interfaces as well as key assumptions. 
2. Preparation Phase 
 Identify and locate supporting data and information, 
 Identify the end users of the study outputs, 
 Prepare project management preparations (ex: schedule of meetings, 
transcribing proceedings, etc.), 
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 Prepare template format for recording study outputs, 
 Set HAZOP guidewords to be used during the study. 
3. Examination Phase (5): 
 Split the system into study nodes, 
 At each study node specify a relevant set of process variables (parameters), 
such as temperature, pressure, flow level, and chemical composition. 
 Apply guidewords one at a time for all process parameters in order to 
identify possible deviations and document the study in a worksheet. 
The team leader should plan and decide the schedule, duration of review meetings, 
and arrange the essential documents such as drawing plans, operating procedure; 
the team leader has to decide the beginning point (scope of the study) and 
boundaries of study (24). 
The team members try to imagine ways in which hazards and operating problems 
might arise in a network.  
The performance of study is depending on many factors such as: duration of 
study, proper planning and management of study schedule, team content, number 
of team members, and experience of team leader and participation of team 
members (24) 
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2.2.2.3 Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
PHA is an inductive analysis method where the objective is to identify the hazards, 
hazardous situations and events that can cause harm for a given activity, facility or 
system (IEC, 1995). 
2.2.2.4 TECHNEAU Hazard Database (THDB) 
THDB methodology presents a comprehensive list of hazards and hazardous 
events that can serve as a checklist for water utilities; it is detailed to help end-
users working in water supply system in all steps of development to carry out the 
hazard identification process, by providing a catalogue with potential hazards of 
technical, environmental or human origin for the entire system (29). 
The database has to be generic for ease of use and at the same time be complete 
for providing sufficient information (30). 
According to THDB, water supply system is subdivided into 12 sub-systems, 10 of 
them are physical sub-systems representing the installations, one is a non-physical 
subsystem representing organizational aspects, and one is representing future 
hazards. 
2.2.3 Risk Estimation techniques 
2.2.3.1 Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) 
FMECA is often the first step in a reliability analysis and involves reviewing as many 
components, assemblies, and subsystems as possible to identify failure modes, 
causes, and effects of such failures (31). 
FMECA involves reviewing as many components, assemblies, and subsystems as 
possible to identify failure modes, causes, and effects of such failures, it is usually 
carried out during the design phase of a system in order to reveal weaknesses and 
potential failures at an early state. 
2.2.3.2 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
FTA is a deductive system analysis (from general to specific) to identify various 
ways that a system failure or accident may occur, it is a logic diagram that displays 
the interrelationships between a potential “critical” event in a system and the causes 
of this event (31) 
Ericson (32) provided in his paper an overview on the historical aspects of the Fault 
Tree Analysis, the paper includes important developments on FTA through the 
years, improvements in the process and contributions. 
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FTA was originally developed in 1962 at Bell Laboratories by H.A. Watson, in 
connection with a U.S. Air Force Ballistics Systems Division contract to evaluate the 
Minuteman Launch Control System (32) 
In 1965, Boeing and university of Washington sponsored 1st System Safety 
conference where several papers were presented FTA that make it spread 
worldwide, then in 1971 the nuclear power industry began using FTA in the design 
and development of nuclear power plant. 
Within the nuclear power industry, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission began 
using Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) methods including FTA in 1975, and 
significantly expanded PRA research following the 1979 incident at Three Mile 
Island. This eventually led to the 1981 publication of the NRC Fault Tree Handbook 
NUREG–0492 
During 1981-recent, FTA has also been adopted by the chemical process industry, 
the auto industry, robotic industry and water management field and so many others 
(32) 
In Sweden, fault tree analysis was used on an integrated level of a large drinking 
water system to develop a method for integrated and probabilistic risk analysis of 
entire drinking water systems; the analysis included situations where no water is 
delivered to the consumer (quantity failure) and situations where water is delivered 
but does not comply with water quality standards (quality failure), then the 
applicability of Customer Minutes Lost (CML) as a measure of risk was evaluated 
as the rest of the study (6) 
A new approach based on a combination of traditional predictive modeling, and 
event/fault tree analysis techniques, which allow the representation of normal and 
abnormal (i.e. failures) variations of parameters throughout the food chain and in 
the processing parameters in the food industry for a better estimation of the real 
impact of such deviations and failures on consumer safety (33) 
A properly constructed fault tree provides a good illustration of the various 
combinations of (component) technical failures, human errors, normal events, and 
environmental factors that may result in a critical event for the system (5) 
Critical event is called the top event of the FT and the events on the lowest level are 
called basic events, various events are connected through logic gates, OR gates or 
AND gates (34)  
Fault tree should be constructed due to the circumstances of the actual system 
instead of being fitted to actual data, then when hard data is missing or insufficient, 
expert judgments must be used (6) 
A fault tree is tailored to its top event which corresponds to some particular system 
failure mode, and the fault tree thus includes only those faults that contribute to this 
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top event. Moreover, these faults are not exhaustive- they cover only the most 
credible faults as assessed by analyst (34)  
It is important to understand that FTA is not a model of all possible system failures 
or all causes for a system failure. 
Fault Tree analysis is normally carried out in the following steps: 
1. System and boundary conditions definition 
Describe studied system; define the boundary conditions, initial state of the system 
and operating conditions. 
2. Top event selection 
Define particular failure mode to analyze, the Top event, which should describe 
WHAT the undesired event is and WHEN it happens. 
3. FT diagram construction 
All immediate, necessary and sufficient causes are numbered and sequenced in the 
order of occurrence and then are used for drawing or constructing FT diagram 
based on AND and OR gates. 
4. FT Evaluation  
Evaluation process is to identify minimal cut sets, compute the probabilities and 
compute criticality measures. 
FTA may be qualitative or quantitative evaluation depending on the objectives of 
the analysis:  
 Qualitative, is to generate the cut sets only, and  
 Quantitative, is to generate the cut sets, probabilities, and importance 
measures, more details in section 3.4.2.6 
Minimal cut set is a unique set of events that together cause the UE to occur, it 
consists one or many events. 
Path set is a group of events that if none of them occurs, the top UE event won‟t 
occur. 
 ( )   ( ̅)            4 
Where 
 ( )  is the probability of Minimal cut set and 
 ( ̅)  is the probability of Path set 
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2.2.3.3 Event Tree Analysis (ETA) 
ETA is a forward logic diagram that examines all possible responses to the initiating 
event progressing left to right across the page (31). 
ETA is normally carried out in the following steps as it used in Hong and Lee study 
(35):   
1. Identifying initiating event 
2. Selecting safety functions 
The safety function (SF) is general countermeasures against certain expected 
problems; it may be sequenced from specific initiating events. 
3. Construction of ET 
Construct the ET diagram then the success or failure of the applied SF has been 
identified on the top of each branch as either „Yes‟ or „No‟. 
Under risk estimation techniques, we can also mention: Reliability Block diagram; 
Barriers and Bow-tie diagrams, and Human Reliability Assessment (HRA). 
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2.2.3.4 Discussion of used methods in risk estimation in the research 
Section 2.2 defines the most common projects, methods and techniques in risk 
analysis field and focuses with details on HAZOP and FTA methods which I used in 
my research. 
Dempster-Shafer theory and Monte-Carlo method were employed in this research 
for probabilities analysis purpose 
 Dempster-Shafer theory 
DS theory is approach to express uncertain judgments of experts; it allows coping 
with absence of preference, due to limitations of the available information, which 
results in indeterminacy. Its calculus describes the subjective viewpoint as an 
assessment for an unknown objective fact (36) 
About DS-Evidence theory, Evidence theory was first proposed by Dempster (1967, 
1968) and later extended by Shafer (1976). This theory is also called Dempster–
Shafer theory (DST) (37) 
DST became known to the safety and reliability community in the early 1990s (38) 
DST is very useful to express uncertain judgments of experts; its calculus describes 
the subjective viewpoint as an assessment for an unknown objective fact (36) 
When the ignorance or conflicts in the available data are significantly high, a 
Bayesian approach may not properly aggregate multi-expert knowledge because 
Bayesian approach is based on probability theory; it aggregates data without 
differentiating aleatory and epistemic uncertainties. Moreover, it requires prior 
information which sometimes limits its application to updating existing information, 
DS-Evidence theory addresses these issues effectively and it is able to combine 
multi-expert knowledge by taking into account ignorance and conflicts through a 
belief structure (39) 
Cheng (40) paper shows that the lower/upper bound intervals obtained from 
evidence theory can be used to calculate the failure probability interval of the top 
event directly, i.e. without needing to transform into 3-valued forms like in Guth 
approach. 
DST as presented in Rakowsky article is based on a scenario that contains the 
system with: 
 Hypotheses (the possible states/ consequences),  
 Pieces of evidence (events that occurred or may occur in the system/ 
causes)   
 Data sources (experts, operators or organizations which have to be 
representative and free of bias) 
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In DS theory, frame of discernment Ω is defined as a set of mutually exclusive 
elements that allow having a total of    subsets in a power set (P), where Ω is the 
cardinality of a frame of discernment. For example, if Ω = {T, F}, then the power set 
(P) includes four subsets, i.e., {ø (a null set), {T}, {F}, and {T, F}}. 
Applying Dempster-Shafer Theory to FTA can help modeling uncertainties with less 
effort as shown by Guth, he discusses Ω= {h1, h2, h3} ≡ {“event occurs”, 
“uncertain”, “event does not occur”}. (38) 
DS Theory depends on belief structure and Estimate Value (Bet) to interpret the 
outcome probability of event. 
Belief structure represents a continuous interval [belief (Bel), plausibility (Pl)] in 
which true probability may lie Fig.8, it takes into account the ignorance and conflicts 
in multi-expert knowledge and provides a range for the event probability, and Bet 
estimate value gives a point estimate in a belief structure (similar to defuzzification 
in fuzzy set theory) (41) 
 
Fig. 8 Measures of belief and plausibility (41) 
DS uses basic parameters Equ.5, Equ.6, Equ.7 and Equ.8: 
 Basic probability assignment (bpa), which known as belief mass  (  ) that 
represents the degree of expert belief for each subset (Note: belief mass is 
not a probability) (36): 
 (  )  ,   -   ( )      ∑  (  )            5 
 Belief measure (Bel): 
   (  )  ∑  (  )               6 
 Plausibility measure (Pl): 
  (  )  ∑  (  )               7 
 Estimate value (Bet): 
   ( )  ∑
 (  )
|  |
   
         
8 
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The knowledge obtained from multiple experts requires aggregation to be used, the 
combination rules allow aggregating the individual beliefs of multi-experts (e.g. DS 
and Yager rules) (41). 
The most common combination rules include: 
Yager, Smets, Inagaki, Dubois and Prade, Zhang, Murphy, and more recently 
Dezert and Smarandache (39) 
Combination rules use orthogonal sum equation, Equ.9: 
                        9 
Where  
   is the minimal cut set i 
   is the operator of combination 
For example, according to DS combination     (  ) equals: 
           
∑   (  )  (  )          
   
                10 
According to Yager combination      (  ) equals: 
                    11 
∑   (  )  (  )          
        
 
∑   (  )  (  )             
        
 
Where 
k  measures the degree of conflict between the two experts 
  ∑   (  )  (  )                 12 
 Monte Carlo method 
Monte Carlo method (MC) was invented in 1946 by Stanislaw Ulam, a Polish born 
mathematician, while he was determining the probabilities of winning in a card 
game of solitaire. MC method provides approximate solutions for many 
mathematical problems by generating random numbers and calculating what 
fraction of the numbers obey some property or properties; it consists of a 
performance of a simulation using random numbers to determine the future 
behavior of a random variable. 
MC method could be used to generate a database of studied parameter in the 
project, Monte Carlo simulation can be performed to fulfill the missing values (if 
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any) in the original database, as it provides flexibility, manage the uncertainty and 
even provide more accurate results than simple descriptive statistics (e.g. the 
average value). 
In practice, it is difficult and expensive to obtain precise estimates of event 
probability because in a majority of cases these estimates are the result of an 
expert‟s limited knowledge, incomplete information, poor quality data or imperfect 
interpretation of a failure mechanism, these unavoidable issues impart uncertainties 
in the ETA and make the entire risk analysis process less credible for decision 
making (41) 
To describe uncertainties in input data (i.e., event likelihood) and propagate them 
through ETA, probability-based approaches such as Monte Carlo simulations 
(MCS) have been traditionally used (Bae et al., 2004). This approach requires 
sufficient empirical information to derive probability density functions (PDFs) of the 
input data, which are generally not available (Wilcox and Ayyub, 2003), As an 
alternative to objective data, expert knowledge/judgment is used, especially when 
the data collection is either difficult or very expensive (Rosqvist, 2003) (41) 
Nicholas Metropolis and Stanislaw Ulam (Izquierdo, 2004) presented motivation 
and a general description of MC method dealing with a class of problems in 
mathematical physics. It is, essentially, a statistical approach to study of differential 
equations, or more generally, of Integra differential equations that occur in various 
branches of the natural sciences. 
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 3 BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE METHODOLOGY 
 Description of studied IWS system 3.1
In general, water supply system with intermittent pattern could be: 
 Designed, modeled and operated as intermittent water supply, for example 
Ajman water supply network, or 
 Designed and modeled as continuous water supply then operated as 
intermittent water supply because of changes in circumstances, for example 
Damascus water supply network. 
Intermittent water supply networks have additional elements for each node: 
 Storage system for each demand node (building or group of buildings) in the 
system, or 
 Storage system for each customer node (Flat or house) in the system. 
The consumers of water are not restricted only by the pressure that is available in the 
distribution network, but also they are restricted by the capacity of the roof and ground 
storage tanks. 
From the hydraulic point of view, when the consumers are using the water from their 
storage tanks, they are disconnected from the distribution system, and two 
independent patterns can be distinguished in this case: 
 1st pattern is at the customers tap which is actually a consumption pattern, 
Fig.4. 
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 2nd pattern is at the tank which is actually a filling pattern, and it is a 
consequence of the hydraulic operation of the network, representing a pressure 
related discharge, and it differs for each node in the network. 
Each customer node (Flat or house) is provided with storage system to store water 
during supply hours and use it during interruption hours, each storage system consists 
of: 
 Household (roof or attic) water storage tanks. 
 Household water pumping system. 
3.1.1 Household water storage tanks 
In Damascus suburbs, it is common to use attic tanks or roof tanks Fig.9. 
 
Fig. 9 Attic and roof water storage tanks 
The used households‟ water storage tanks have wide range of sizes, materials and 
shapes. 
According to the materials, households‟ water tanks could be classified into: 
1. Corrugated Galvanized Steel water storage tanks 
They could have many shapes, the most commons are round Fig.10 or rectangular; 
these tanks are internally coated with approved certified coatings to use it for potable 
water (42). 
Although very popular in the past these corrugated galvanized tanks are being outsold 
by the Plastic (Polyethylene) tanks, Possibly due to the lower cost and the Poly tanks 
look nicer and can be manufacture in just about any form and colored to fit into the 
surrounding environment. 
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Fig. 10 Steel water storage tank (43) 
2. Plastic (Polyethylene) water storage tanks 
Plastic storage tanks are available in an extremely wide range of sizes and shapes, the 
most commons are round, slim line Fig.11 (becoming popular due to houses being built 
on smaller blocks) or rectangular. Research shows that the size of these tanks can 
vary between 700 and 5,000 liters, water storage tanks also can be purchased in a 
variety of colors. 
 
Fig. 11 Polyethylene water storage tanks 
An advantage of Plastic Tanks is that they are made from light weight materials. The 
weight saving means lower costs and greater ease of transport, handling and 
positioning. Tanks made from plastic are usually less likely to react to the liquid which 
is stored in them (44). 
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3. Bladder water storage tanks: 
Bladder storage tanks are becoming more popular nowadays due to lack of space in 
the modern homes, they can be installed under houses, decks or on the attic Fig.12. 
and could be removed when the owner decides to relocate. 
Potable water bladder tanks are made out of material approved for storing consumable 
liquids and come in sizes up to 10,000 liters (42). 
 
Fig. 12 Bladder water storage tank (45) 
According to the capacity, the water storage tanks could be classified into: 
1. Small water storage tanks 
The capacity is between 100-500 liters 
2. Average water storage tanks 
The capacity is between 500-2000 liters  
3. Big water storage tanks 
The capacity is more than 2000 liters 
According to the shape and positioning, the water storage tanks could be classified 
into: 
1. Round water storage tanks 
 
Fig. 13 Round water tank 
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2. Slim-line water storage tanks 
 
Fig. 14 Slim line water tanks 
3. Rectangular water storage tanks 
 
Fig. 15 Rectangular water tank 
4. Vertical water storage tanks, Fig.13 
5. Horizontal water storage tanks, Fig.15 
3.1.2 Level Control valves 
The storage tank should be provided with LCV (Level Control Valve) to control the 
water level and stop overflow water. 
1. Float valves 
Float valve is a machine for avoiding overflow and backflow while filling water tanks (in 
the event of low water pressure) . The modern float valve was invented by Joseph 
Bramah and Thomas Twyford (8). 
 
Fig. 16 Float Valves (46) 
It is designed to either full open when water level reaches a predetermined low point or 
full closed when a predetermined high point is reached. 
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It is a hydraulically operated with pilot controlled valve which is actuated by a float ball 
to limit the high and low liquid levels in the tank or reservoir by closing or opening the 
main valve. High and low liquid levels are adjustable. 
The installation of float valve is clearly described in the Fig.17 
 
Fig. 17 Installation of float valve in the tank (46) 
2. Modulating float valves 
They can be installed to proportional control the flow into or out of the tank by either 
partially closing on or partially opening on. It is a hydraulically operated and pilot 
controlled valve, Fig.18 
 
Fig. 18 Modulating float Valve (46) 
3. Altitude valves 
The main valve is controlled by a highly sensitive pilot, it is located outside the tank. 
The pilot opens or closes the valve in response to the static pressure of the water, 
closes at a preset maximum water level to prevent overflow of a storage tank and 
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opens to refill when the water level in the tank lowers, the pilot allows for differential 
adjustments between the maximum and minimum level (46). 
Altitude Control Valve is accurate, automatic level control, without the use of floats or 
sensors, it could be one-way flow is used for tank fill only or two-way flow into and out 
of the tank. 
 
Fig. 19 Altitude Valve (46) 
It is installed out of tank as shown in the Fig.20 
 
Fig. 20 Altitude valve position (48) 
4. Water level sensor 
The water level sensor is conducive for liquids that have a conductivity of equal to or 
more than 25m Siemens. It is a good choice for a water level switch. 
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3.1.3 Household water pumping system 
In general, the used pump‟s type for domestic purpose is horizontal centrifugal pump.  
 
Fig. 21 Example of household water pump Q-H curves 
Household water pumps are selected based on the following criteria: 
 Required flow, high performance, for single flat 20-100 LPM Fig.21 
 Required head (lift), high performance, for single flat 15-50 m Fig.21 
 Space constraints, the size 
 Whether it is likely ever to be run dry, 
 Whether it needs to be self-priming 
 Hydraulic and motor efficiencies - less energy consumed, 
 Pump and motor design – reliability improvements, 
 The customized options – e.g. alternative seals and voltage ranges, 
 Drink water compatible, 
 Quieter in operation, and the price 
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 Risk Analysis Methodology for IWS systems 3.2
For intermittent water supply system, Fig.22 illustrates the generic framework of Risk 
Analysis Methodology. 
It distinguishes between two different cases of the methodology; Simple Risk Analysis 
Methodology (SRAM) and Complex Risk Analysis Methodology (CRAM) which differ in 
Probability analysis procedures, Fig.23 
 
Fig. 22 Generic framework of Risk Analysis Methodology for IWS systems 
Scope definition 
System definition and 
decomposition 
Circumstances definition 
Operational state definition 
Boundary conditions 
Undesired Events 
identification 
Study team members 
Study plan preparation 
HAZOP implementation 
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UE definition 
Fault Tree Analysis diagram 
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FT evaluation 
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Risk level 
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Fig. 23 Probability Analysis under Simple and Complex Methodology 
Probability Analysis 
Data collection and preparation 
Hard data available 
Complex Methodology/ CRAM 
MonteCarlo simulation 
MTBF and Downtime calculation  
BEs probabilities estimation 
FT diagram calculation 
Risk level 
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Simple Methodology/ SRAM 
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FT diagram calculation 
Risk level 
3 BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE METHODOLOGY
 ____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
VUT, 2014  44 
 
3.2.1 Hard data 
Hard data are measurement, records, reports and statistics, for example: 
 Operational records: supply pattern, customers‟ meters and billing records, 
pressure records, known problems, control and monitors methods. 
 Operational diary: information of the frequency of electrical power cut and 
records of failures. 
 Maintenance, repairs and cleaning plan: maintenance frequency and 
procedures, documentation of implemented maintenance plan, cleaning works 
plan, and duration of repairs. 
 Records of failures: pipelines, valves, technological and technical failures. 
 Any pre-existing compiled data taken from previous studies on the system. 
 Buildings documentation: current and future projects. 
 Documentation of technical executed reconstruction: water supply network, 
objects. 
 Highest and lowest temperatures, climate in the region. 
 Old used technologies. 
 Analysis of the distributed water in the last 5 years, if it is available. 
 Analysis of inflow and outflow and changes in water storage levels in the 
reservoir. 
 Survey pipelines 
 Technical information about valves: valves types, casting year, replacement 
records, locations, technical state and maintenance frequency. 
 Technical condition of the drainage and characters of the sewer system 
network. 
 Knowledge about paralleling and crossing areas with sewer system and heat 
water system. 
 Records of pumping station, the technical condition of the pumps and 
information about previous failures and repairs. 
 Information about the end-users (consumers) 
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3.2.2 Complex Risk Analysis Methodology 
CRAM steps as shown in Fig.22: 
 Scope definition, 
 Undesired Events Identification, 
 Risk Estimation: 
 Fault Tree diagram construction, 
 Probability analysis with available data Fig.23 , briefly the major steps: 
1. Estimate the probability    for each basic event     under uncertainty by 
modelling the available data and performing the calculations with Monte 
Carlo simulation since hard data is available, more detail in section 3.4.3.1 
2. Calculate the probability of occurrence of top event using Fault Tree 
equations, Equ.31 
 Consequences analysis (the number of consumers affected), more detail 
are available in section.3.4.4 
 Risk level evaluation Equ.41, Equ.42 
  
3 BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE METHODOLOGY
 ____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
VUT, 2014  46 
 
3.2.3 Simple Risk Analysis Methodology 
SRAM steps as shown in Fig.22: 
 Scope definition, 
 Undesired Events Identification, 
 Risk Estimation: 
 Fault Tree diagram construction, 
 Probability analysis with No available hard data Fig.23, briefly the major 
steps are: 
1. Estimate the probability    for each basic event     under uncertainty by 
applying Dempster-Shafer theory depending on experts‟ judgments since the 
hard data is not available, more details in section 3.4.3.2 
2. Calculate the probability of occurrence of top event using Fault Tree 
equations, Equ.31 
 Consequences analysis (the number of consumers affected), more details 
are available in section.3.4.4 
 Risk level evaluation Equ.41 and 42 
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 Undesired Events identification 3.3
UEs identification considers quality, operational, technical and technological UEs that 
may happen in the system and financial, healthy and social UEs that may impact the 
customers;  
For potential UEs identification process and catalogue list setting, the proposed 
methodology employed HAZard and Operability (HAZOP) technique. 
DPSIR framework is useful to clearly managing and analyzing IWS system to identify 
undesired events and suggest Risk Reduction Strategy. 
DPSIR analytical framework is a chain of causal links, table.2: 
 Driving force: is the need; 
 Pressure: is the activities that triggers the possible risk and fault into the 
system; 
 State: is the real and existing state of the system; 
 Impacts: are the bad or Undesired Events that may happen in the system 
because of the State 
 Responses: are the measures and risk reduction options by changing and 
affecting in Pressure, State, Impacts factors (49) 
Describing the causal chain from driving forces to impacts and responses is a complex 
task, and tends to be broken down into sub-tasks, e.g. by considering the pressure-
state relationship. 
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Table 2   Water risk project for IWS system presented in DPSIR framework 
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3.3.1 Hazard Operability Analysis technique (HAZOP) 
implementation 
HAZOP process involves a detailed study of each part of the entire water supply 
network from transmission main to household connection with the help of supply plan 
drawings of the network that covering pipes, households pumps, vessels, conduits, 
connections, valves, and other equipment, the drawings are studied in relation to the 
operation plan of the network. 
HAZOP focuses on the causes that may lead to variations in the designed operational 
manner due to human errors, process, or material failures, and the likely 
consequences of those variations. 
HAZOP takes into consideration quality and quantity parameters such as flow rate; 
pressure; PH; total and fecal coli forms. 
During examination phase of HAZOP study, team members try to imagine ways in 
which hazards and operational problems might arise in a network. To cover all possible 
failures in the network, the imagination of the HAZOP study team members is guided in 
a systematic way using a set of „guide words‟ to generate the process variable‟s 
deviations. 
HAZOP analysis process is executed in four phases as illustrated below (28): 
 Definition Phase 
1. Select study team members: team leader; process engineer; operator; safety 
representative; control system engineer; and maintenance engineer 
2. Study team identifies the assessment scope: Defining study boundaries and 
key assumptions. 
 Preparation Phase  
1. Identify and locate supporting data and information 
2. Prepare project management preparations (example: scheduling meetings, 
transcribing proceedings) 
3. Prepare template format for recording study outputs (HAZOP worksheets) 
4. Set HAZOP guide words to be used during the study, 
5. The used guide words are showen in table 3: 
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Table 3   Guide words 
 
 Examination Phase 
1. Split the system into study nodes, study nodes in the project could be: 
 Node on transmission main 
 Node on household‟s connection 
 Hydraulic critical node in the network 
 Quality critical node in the network 
2. Choose for each study node its relevant parameters or indicators to start 
brainstorming discussion, as shown in Fig.24 and table.4 
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Table 4   Study nodes and parameters 
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3. Apply guidewords one at a time for all process parameters and document the 
study in a worksheet. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 24 Study nodes and parameters using HAZOP technique 
 
  
Node on household‟s connection 
- Pump‟s characteristics 
- Volume of stored water 
- Microbial and chemical 
indicators in the tank: 
Total and Fecal 
coliforms 
PH 
TOC and DOC 
Quality critical node 
- Disinfectants residual 
- Microbial indicators 
such as: 
Total and Fecal 
coliforms 
 
- Chemical indicators: 
PH 
Total and dissolved 
organic carbon 
TOC/DOC 
- Pressure 
- Water losses in the 
network till this node 
Hydraulic critical node 
Node on 
transmission main 
- Pressure 
- Flow rate 
- Duration and 
Frequency of supply 
Disinfectants doses 
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3.3.2 HAZOP documents 
All following HAZOP documents (tables) are depending on reading, brain storming, 
discussions with water utility‟s experts, and academic information; they are not 
depending on a real case study. 
In a real case study some modifications could be taken into account, for example: 
 We may change or add new study nodes according to the available data 
 We may add or delete some parameters according to the available data 
 We may add more guide words or use other criteria to determine the deviations 
of the system from standard operating conditions. 
Even if we relied on the same study nodes and tables, the causes, undesired events or 
the responses may be changed according to the real situation in studied system. 
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Table 5   Flow rate parameter in transmission main 
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Table 6   Pressure parameter in transmission main 
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Table 7   Duration and frequency of supply  parameter in Transmission main 
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Notes for table.7:  
The duration of supply stands to the number of supply hours per day and the frequency of supply stands to the number of supply days per week 
The duration and the frequency of supply affect the operational mode of the system, the consumers‟ behaviors, the required amount of stored 
water and the quality of water in the storage tanks and the network 
The table differs from the standard one; the scenarios consider that 12 hours is the basis of our comparative: 
12 ≤ t ≤ 24 refers to more than 12 hours 
4 ≤ t ≤ 12 refers to less than 12 hours 
The consequences of the both status is the same in definitions, but they differ in the severity (intensity) of the event 
For the frequency, we will discuss daily or not daily situations 
We will here assume only the boundary cases (marginal cases); I mean the best case and the worst case that we may face in intermittent water 
supply systems 
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Table 8   Doses of disinfectant  parameter in Transmission main 
 
Note for table.8: 
For table 6, Chlorine is added to water as either in aqueous solution (calcium hypochlorite or sodium hypochlorite) or chlorine gas. Smaller 
supplies may use tablets of hypochlorite. 
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Table 9   Pump’s characteristics  parameter in household’s  connection 
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Table 10   Volume of stored water parameter in household’s  connection 
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Table 11  Total and fecal coliforms  parameter in household’s  connection 
 
Note for table.11: 
The figure 25 shows bacterial count of the influent water and water after being stored for different periods in house-hold storage tanks. This 
increase was accompanied by a decrease in turbidity and chlorine residual and an increase in TOC and pH (50) 
 
Fig. 25  Bacterial count in stored water in house-hold storage tanks 
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Table 12   TOC/DOC parameter in household’s  connection 
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Table 13   Pressure parameter in hydraulic critical node 
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Table 14   Water losses parameter in hydraulic critical node 
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Table 15   Disinfectant residual in quality critical node 
 
Note for table.15: 
In water supplies which are chlorinated there should always be a minimum of 0.5mg/l residual chlorine after 30 minutes contact time in all points in 
piped supply, This means that a chlorine residual of about 1mg/l when  water leaves the treatment plant is needed, in tanker trucks, at filling 
2.0mg/l (51) 
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Table 16   Total and fecal coliforms  in quality critical node 
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Table 17   PH  in quality critical node 
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Table 18   TOC/DOC in quality critical node 
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3.3.3 Undesired Events catalogue list 
As a result of HAZOP implementation, the catalogue list of the potential UEs has been 
defined: 
UE 1_ Low operational pressure, 
UE 2_ Interruption in water supply, 
UE 3_ Inadequate hydraulic capacity of the network, 
UE 4_ Troubles in fire-fighting systems, 
UE 5_ Ingress of contaminated ground water or sewage water into the network, 
UE 6_ Deterioration of microbiological parameters of the distributed water, 
UE 7_ Deterioration of microbiological parameters of water in storage tanks and cisterns,  
UE 8_ Biofilm production, 
UE 9_ Biofilm detachment event, 
UE 10_ High doses of disinfectants, 
UE 11_ THMs and other disinfection‟s by-products Production, 
UE 12_ Unacceptable turbidity values of the distributed water, 
UE 13_ Deterioration in taste, smell, or temperature of the distributed water, 
UE 14_ Corrosion the inner surface of the pipelines, 
UE 15_ Increasing in water losses, 
UE 16_ Equipment, meters, and valves failure, 
UE 17_ Breaks and cracks in the pipelines, 
UE 18_ Financial pressure on the customers, 
UE 19_ Health risk for customers 
 
The methodology of risk estimation for one of UE (Low operational pressure) is presented in 
the following chapter as an example 
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 Risk estimation for UE_ Low operational pressure 3.4
Low pressure in IWS system may occur because of: 
 Low water flow in the network 
 High rate of water withdraw from a limited capacity network in a short period, so 
hydrodynamic operational pressure will decrease under its designed values. 
 Low supplied pressure value in transmission main. 
Low operational pressure and short supply period force customers to use households‟ 
pumps to meet the required pressure and to use roof tanks to store as much water as they 
can during supply hours to use it later during interruption hours, these pumps and tanks 
increase the problem because they increase rate of water withdraw during supply period. 
3.4.1 Fault Tree analysis for UE 
As mentioned before in the section 2.2.3.2, fault Tree analysis is normally carried out in the 
following steps: 
3.4.1.1 System and boundary conditions definition 
All detail about studied system; the boundary conditions, initial state of the system and 
operating conditions are mentioned in section 3.1 
3.4.1.2 Top event selection 
UE_ Low operational pressure is the particular failure mode to analyze (Top event), section 
3.4.1 describe WHAT the undesired event is and WHEN it happens. 
Table.19. presents the criteria for each water system components that affect the UE_ Low 
operational pressure in intermittent water supply system 
3 BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE METHODOLOGY
 _________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
VUT, 2014  73 
 
Table 19   Criteria in each system component 
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3.4.1.3 FT diagram construction 
All immediate, necessary and sufficient causes (Events) are numbered and sequenced in the 
order of occurrence and then are used for drawing or constructing FT diagram based on 
AND and OR gates. 
Each event in level (      ) is considered sub-top event when processing the next level 
(        ), Fig.26 
The proposed fault tree diagram doesn‟t have MOE (Multiple occurring events)
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Fig. 26 Schematic fault tree for UE_ Low operational pressure in IWS system 
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3.4.1.4 Basic Events description 
     _Supply failure 
    is any water supply value S less than a critical value (required or designed)  . 
That could happen because of one or more of the following:  
 Decreasing in annual precipitations compared with normal precipitation 
 Degradation in groundwater levels with no ability to compensate it during the years. 
 Reduction in the minimum water flow in rivers or degradation in the water level in 
lakes or reservoir 
 Biological or chemical contaminations access to the water source and the quality 
becomes unacceptable to use it for drinking or domestic purposes with inadequate 
treatment plant capacity or inefficient to deal with new contamination 
 Seawater intrusion into the groundwater due to high withdraw rate from the wells 
 Failure in distribution sub-system 
     _ Demand failure 
    is water demand value D more than critical (designed) value     
That could happen because of one or more of the following:  
 Rapid or unplanned urbanization, new districts and buildings are built or/and 
predicted and they will loaded on the existing water and electricity networks that 
could overload some nodes in the network. 
 Population growth, estimated population growth rate in Middle East and Africa is 
between (40-50%), according to United Nations statistics between 1990 and 2010 
 Increasing in consumers‟ demand because of the weather, the seasons and the life 
type of people, etc. 
     _Technical failure  
    is any failure could happen to the pumping system and cause partially or fully disable in 
water supply process. 
     _Electrical failure  
    is a power interruption because of rationing strategy or of any failures that could happen 
in the electrical power supply system and cause partially or fully disable in water supply 
process. 
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     _Pipelines & equipment failure 
    is any failure that could happen in any equipment or main pipeline in the network and 
cause partially or fully disable in water supply process or cause increasing in the real water 
losses more than the allowed value. 
     _  high water losses 
    is any apparent losses more than allowed value 
Top down audit to estimate water losses (52): 
 Determine the amount of water supplied to the system, typically for a one year period, 
 Determine authorized consumption (billed + unbilled), and  
 Calculate water losses (water losses = system input – authorized consumption)  
 Estimate apparent losses (unauthorized consumption  + customer meter inaccuracies
 + billing errors and adjustments)  
 Calculate real losses (real losses = water losses – apparent losses)  
     _ Duration of supply  
    is the duration of supply under critical value    (   could be 8 or 10 hours) and that 
depends on rationing plan of water utility. 
When the duration of supply is short so the consumers are forced to collect and store water 
in the same short period of time, all pumps works in the same time and that increase velocity 
in the pipelines and decrease pressure and hydraulic capacity of the network. 
When duration of supply is decreasing↓, the rate of withdraw is increasing ↑ as shown in 
Fig.27 and the pressure is decreasing ↓   
In general the water total volume of supplied water is fixed; the duration of supply affects the 
hourly Qs 
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Fig. 27 Supply and demand patterns during a period of 6 or 8 or 10 hours 
     Storage unit characteristics failure 
    is the case of using household pumps with performance higher than recommended and 
a storage tank with capacity larger than recommended. 
Recommended capacity is calculated per capita: 
Daily demand 100 liter/capita, family of 5 persons, the demand is 500 liter/family/day, if the 
water is available 3 days a week so the stored volume should cover 2 days, it should be 
about 1000 liter and that required average storage tank. 
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3.4.1.5 Restrictions on FTA diagram 
Previous FT diagram Fig.26 is applied with the following restrictions: 
1. 1st OR gate is always OR gate 
2. 2nd OR gate is still OR If High rate of losses ≥ 40% Total supplied water, else it will be 
AND gate between two components as follow: 
 
Fig. 28 Restriction of 2
nd
 OR gate 
3. 3rd OR gate still OR gate If the increasing in water demand ≥ critical value, else it will 
be AND gate 
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Fig. 29 Restriction of 3
rd
 OR gate 
4. 4th OR gate is always OR gate 
5. 1st AND gate is still AND If  apparent losses (Unauthorized penetrate to the system 
component) ≤ 40% from total water losses, else it will be OR gate between two 
components as following: 
 
Fig. 30 Restriction of 1
st
 AND gate 
6. 2nd AND gate is always AND   
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3.4.1.6 FT evaluation 
Evaluation process is to identify minimal cut sets, compute the probabilities and risk rate. 
To simplify FT diagram, all basic events are considered independent. 
FT diagram can always be translated into an equivalent set of Boolean equations, thus an 
understanding of the rules of Boolean algebra contributes materially toward the construction 
and simplification of fault trees (34) 
Once the fault tree has been drawn, it can be evaluated to yield its qualitative and 
quantitative characteristics, these characteristics can be obtained from the equivalent 
Boolean equations (34). 
 OR-gate: 
The OR-gate is equivalent to the Boolean symbol “+” 
                             13 
Where  
  ,    are events 
If two events    and    are not mutually independent: 
 (     )   (  )   (  )   (       ) 
 (     )   (  )   (  )   (  )  (     )      14 
For n events,              general formula can be expressed: 
 (             )  
∑  (  )
 
    ∑ ∑  (       )
 
     
   
    (  )
  (                  )   15 
If we ignore the possibility of any two or more of the events 
i
E occurring simultaneously, the 
equation are reduced into: 
 (              )  ∑  (  )
 
          16 
This event is so-called „rare event approximation” that is play an important role in fault tree 
quantification (34). 
If    and    are mutually exclusive then  (         )     
If    and    are independent then  (         )   (  )  (  ) ,  (       ) is small 
compared with  (  )   (  ) ,  so that we can use rare event approximation Equ.16. 
If    are completely dependent on    then  (     )=1  (         )   (  ) 
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 AND-gate : 
The AND-gate is equivalent to the Boolean symbol “.” 
                              17 
Consider now two events    and    that are not mutually independent, they are 
interdependent, in order to treat events like this nature, we introduce a concept of conditional 
probability, we need a new symbol  (     ), which is the probability of   , given    has 
already occurred. 
 (      )   (  )  (     )         18 
For n events,             general formula can be expressed: 
 (         )   (  )  (     )  (          )  (               )    19 
If    and    are mutually independent, then  (     )   (  ) and  (     )   (  )  the 
equation will be: 
 (      )   (  )  (  )  20 
For n events: 
 (          )   (  )  (  )   (  )        21 
3.4.1.7 The minimal cut sets 
A minimal cut set is a unique set of events that together cause the UE to occur, it consists 
one or many events. 
The minimal cut set expression for the UE can be written in general form Equ.22: 
                       
22 
Where 
     is the top event (UE)  
   
is a minimal cut set 
Each minimal cut set consists of a combination of specific component failures    (Basic 
events) and hence the general n-component minimal cut set can be expressed Equ.23 
                       
23 
We can determine the cut sets of the FT by following the steps: 
 The tree is first translated to its equivalent Boolean equations, Equ.13 and Equ.17 
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 Either the top-down substitution method (we start with the top event equation then 
substitute and expand using Boolean laws Equ.24,25,26 and 27 until the minimal cut 
set for the top event is obtained) or bottom-up substitution method is used 
The distributive law 
   (     )                     24 
   (     )                     25 
The absorption law 
   (     )              26 
                     27 
Minimal cut set for the proposed fault tree diagram in general case, Fig.26; 
              
                           
     (       )      (       )          
                          28 
For other cases of diagram, we have to substitute the gates with events using the equations: 
13, 17, 24, and 25 for example: 
IF 2nd OR gate turned into 3rd AND gate Fig.28, the minimal cut set: 
               
                           
     (       )      (       )          
                        29 
In our case, all minimal cut sets    are independent and we ignore the possibility of any two 
or more of the events    occurring simultaneously, the equation are reduced into rare event 
approximation (Equ.16) if the probabilities of the events are small enough: 
 (   )   (              ∑  (  )
 
         30 
Or we use minimal cut set upper bound 
 (   )    ∏ (   (  ))
 
      ,(   (  )) (   (  ))  (   (  ))-  31 
To calculate the probability of top event according to general case of tree, Equ.31 
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 (   )    ∏(   (  ))
 
   
 
 (   )    ,(   (  ))(   (  ))  (   (  ))  (   (  ))  (   (  ))
 (   (  ))- 
 (   )  
  ,(   (   )) (  , (   )  (   )-) (   (   )) (  , (   )  (   )-) (  
 (   )) (   (   )-          32 
3.4.2 Probability analysis 
To calculate probability of top event  (   ), the probabilities of basic events  (   ) are 
required 
 Non-repairable basic events: 
 (   )     
              33 
 Repairable basic events: 
 (   )      (     )         34 
 
Where 
   is an event failure rate (1/hour) 
   is exposure time or repair time (hour) 
                   35 
Where 
MTBF  is the Mean Time between Failures (hour) 
FT‟s deal with small numbers for example:  (      ) means one failure per million hours 
To simplify the calculations we can combine the repairable and non-repairable events and 
use one equation Equ.34 to calculate the probability considering   is exposure or repair time. 
The major problem is always how to calculate or estimate the value of probabilities and 
consequences under uncertainty – Lack of data, insufficient historical records and/or 
unreliable data, uncertainty of failure detection, uncertainty of employed methodology of risk 
analysis and proper interpretation, etc. Using a combination of hard data and experts 
judgments as inputs to estimate the probabilities of events of the fault tree and 
consequences could be useful, Lindhe (53).applied fault tree method for integrated and 
probabilistic risk analysis of drinking water system, he used hard data and experts judgments 
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as input and modeled the variables using Beta and Gamma probability distributions and 
performed the calculations by means of Monte Carlo simulations 
Insufficient available data may be effectively sometimes solved, by using frequency instead 
of mathematical probability of occurrence by using categorization of probability of 
occurrence, severity of consequences based on some chosen factors or indicators, and on 
limits of categories, that will be done by discussion with experts in water utility and collecting 
available data (4). 
Also some studies described that evidence theory/Dempster-Shafer (DS) theory approach is 
very useful to express uncertain judgments of experts; the DST calculus describes the 
subjective viewpoint as an assessment for an unknown objective fact (36). 
The data needed for the fault tree analysis is based on: 
1. Hard data (e.g. measurements and statistics on events),  
2. Experts judgments and 
3. Combinations of both previous options. 
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3.4.2.1 Basic events analysis under Complex Methodology  
Hard data is available: 
1. Specify variable for the BE, 
2. According to available hard data we can choose the appropriate probability 
distribution (density function  ( )) for each     and estimate required parameters, 
3. Use the estimated parameters to generate random values of the variable by applying 
Monte Carlo simulation (with iteration 10,000) using excel worksheets, 
4. Define a critical value and the failure condition 
5. Define the time step between values [hours], for this case study Step= 1 day = 24 
hours 
6. Binary encode the available data [1 represent Y which means the failure occur, 0 
represent N which means the failure is not occur] 
7. Calculate TBFs the time between failures using equation Equ.36 
                   36 
Where 
n  is the number of 0 codes between two sequential 1 codes 
8. Calculate t the exposure time (downtime) using the equation Equ.37 
                        37 
Where 
            is the number of supply hours, which could be 4, 8 or 12 hours 
    is the number of 1 code between two sequential 0 codes 
9. Calculate MTBF and t under uncertainty, Equ.38 
            (   ) 
         ( )         38 
10. Distinguish between repairable and non-repairable events to choose the suitable 
equation Equ.33 or Equ.34 and estimate the probability 
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3.4.2.2 Basic events analysis under Simple Methodology 
 Hard data is NOT available: 
1. Estimate the probabilities under uncertainty using Dempster-Shafer theory section 
2.2.3.4 that depending on experts judgments (Data sources) 
2. Two independent data sources    and    are adequate in this project to estimate 
belief mass (  ) for each subset which is proportion of knowledge to every subset, 
3. For the basic event     we have frame of discernment *   +, Y represents the 
occurrence of the failure and N represents non-occurrence of the failure; the power 
set P includes four subsets {{ø}, {Y}, {N}, {Y, N}} 
4. Belief mass could be estimated according to many methods and approaches 
depending on each data source, in this case study I followed the steps: 
 Each data source estimates MTBF and t according to its experiences, 
available data, statics and historical records or any other information about 
the network, 
 Calculate belief mass  ( )     ( ) using Equ.34 
 Estimate  ( )      ( ) 
 Calculate   (   )      (   ) 
  (   )    ,  ( )    ( )-       39 
5. Calculate the values )(
21
Ym

, )(
21
Nm

 and ),(
21
NYm

 according to combination 
rules, I used Yager combination rules Equ.10 because it handles with the conflict 
between data sources if there is any. 
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6. Arrange the calculations in a table as follows : 
Table 20   Table of DS Theory calculation 
 
2
m  {Y} {N} {Y,N} 
1
m   )(2 Ym  )(2 Nm  ),(2 NYm  
{Y} )(
1
Ym  )()(
21
YmYm   )()(
21
NmYm   ),()(
21
NYmYm   
{N} )(
1
Nm  )()(
21
YmNm   )()(
21
NmNm   ),()(
21
NYmNm   
{Y,N} ),(
1
NYm  )(),(
21
YmNYm   )(),(
21
NmNYm   ),(),(
21
NYmNYm   
 
 


iba
ppp
ba
pmpm )().(
21
    
21
m (combination rules)    
7. Calculate the Estimate Value    ( ) Equ.40 which is equal to the estimated 
probability value of occurrence  
  (   )     ( )  
    (* +)
 
 
    (*  +)
 
      
40 
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3.4.3 Risk level 
Risk level is estimated in terms of Customer Minutes Lost (CML). CML has previously been 
used in the drinking water sector; CML is a measure that corresponds to the number of 
minutes per year the average consumer is affected by failure (6). 
The consequences of failures are defined by the number of people affected; they are 
included in the Fault tree analysis Equ.41 
                 41 
Where  
    is the probability of failure 
C  is the number of consumers affected. 
Since it is not meaningful to estimate the number of people affected for the top event in the 
fault tree, it was estimated at a lower level for n different main types of minimal cut sets, 
Equ.42 
  ∑  (  )   
 
             42 
Where 
 (  ) is the probability of the minimal cut set i 
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 4 CASE STUDY 
 System description 4.1
In this case study we will evaluate the proposed methodology in the thesis Chapter.3, the 
study will be implemented on a supposed water system, the system is not real but it 
simulates real systems in Damasus suburbs/ Syria, the simulation is applied on the 
operational strategy; rationing plan; the general situation of the system and the consumers 
and the senarios of storing and bringing water from private sources. 
Simulated network was designed as a continuous with average age 50 years, it was 
operated as a continuous for about 10 years then latter ,when the quantity of water sources 
is insufficient, it was operated as an intermittent according to a specific rationing plan to 
control the available quantity of water; the household storage system is provided for each 
building node in the system. 
To compensate insufficnet provided  water, some consumers are forced to fullfill thier 
household storage tanks from private sources by tanker trucks, which bring the drinking 
water from near towns or valid sources. 
Total demand covers 55% residential demand; 30% commercial demand and 15% public 
demand, small size of a municipality is 10000 inhabitants, with average water demand 110 
liter/day/person. 
Total annual drinking water production amount is about 346000    equivalents to 95 
liter/day/person which is less than average water demand  
The drinking water supply system is constructed by pumping the water from main water 
source to a water tower, the drinking water then is distributed to the town from the tower by 
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gravity through pipes that made from steel, PVC and cast iron with diameters range from 25, 
80 to 110 mm, and total length of pipe about 50 km  
The main source of water for the town is a group of wells W1, W2 and W3. 
4.1.1 Water source 
The main water source for the network is a group of wells, where it is permitted to take 
annual an amount of water allowed by: 
W1       =166 000 
  
W2       =70 000 
  
W3       =110 000 
  
The water is pumped from three wells into water tower across Iron pipeline 
Water from the wells is healthy and secure chlorinated, the used disinfection agents are 
chlorine and chlorine dioxide, Disinfection with chlorine has the advantage of efficiency and 
durability and that keep good residual disinfectant concentration in the water, which can 
prevent contamination of the water supply system by means of pathogens or 
microorganisms, in the same time water utility tries to control certain factors that influence 
the production of DBPs such as: the amount of disinfectants, the amount of organic material 
or minerals present during disinfection; temperature; PH and reaction time. 
The temperature of the water getting out from the well is between 10 to 16° C 
To reduce corrosion of metal distribution pipes the pH is adjusted to 8 
Laboratory analyses are regular carried out at several points such as the wells and the main 
pipeline  
4.1.2 Distribution system 
The distribution network is approximately 50 km in length and pipe material consists of steel 
(45% from the pipelines network), PVC (40%) and ductile iron (15%). 
The network is supplied with water from a water tower, to ensure sufficient pressure in areas; 
water tower is constructed with a total volume of 1200  . 
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Fig. 31 Water distribution network scheme 
The pressure at the consumers tap has to be in the range of 200 up to 500 kPa (2 up to 5 
bars). 
Minimum allowed pressure in the water main is 100 kPa and the maximum pressure is 700 
kPa 
Pipe corrosion and external loads are common reasons to pipe bursts and breaks that cause 
water leakage. 
Cleaning of water tower carried out by a hired company and once every 2 years  
Household water storage unit is provided for each flat in the building as detailed in section 
3.1.1, while the household water pumping system is provided for the whole building (central 
pump for a building) this assumption simplify the network model by Epanet 2. 
About the operational state of the system, the distribution network is supplied with water 
eight hours a day, and seven days a week because of insufficient quantity of the water 
sources, the water supply pattern shown in Fig.1  
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 Data process 4.2
For the studied water system, I proposed two different data process: 
1st when data is available (CRAM), the outputs are evaluated using 5-years old database 
collected in the town. 
The available hard data are: 
 Supply patterns and known problems for last five years. 
 Available customers meters reading in the last five years.  
 Information of the frequency of electrical power cut and records of failures. 
 Maintenance, repairs and cleaning plan: documentation of implemented maintenance 
plan and frequency, cleaning works plan, and duration of repairs. 
 Available records of failures: pipelines, valves, technological and technical failures for 
last five year. 
 Buildings documentation: current and future expected projects within 5 years. 
 Highest and lowest temperatures, climate in the region. 
 Old used technologies. 
 Analysis of the distributed water in the last 5 years. 
 Survey pipelines 
 Technical information about valves: valves types, casting year, replacement records, 
locations, technical state and maintenance frequency. 
 The technical condition of the pumps, in addition to information about the previous 
failures and repairs. 
 Information about the end-users (consumers) 
2nd when previous data is not available (SRAM), the data sources (experts judgments) will be 
employed 
Fig.26 illustrates a schematic fault tree including the main type of events that may cause Low 
operational pressure in intermittent water supply system; this will be used in our case study 
with some modifications if it is required. 
Basic event divided into repairable and non-repairable events, the equations Equ.33 and 
Equ.34 for non-repairable and repairable are applied to calculate basic events probabilities. 
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Table 21   Events’ types 
 
For both types of events the required variables are failure rate λ and the downtime or repair 
time t, Fig.32. 
 
Fig. 32 TBF and t graph 
As mentioned in section 3.4.3, we will deal with all events in Table.21 as repairable. 
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4.2.1 Complex Methodology outputs 
Data process under CRAM is mentioned in section 3.4.3.1  
Monte Carlo method was be implemented to fulfill the missed data values when data is not 
completely available 
In section 3.4.2.4 all basic events described, and all required variables are mentioned, in this 
case study some more details about BE4 and BE8 should be taken into account in the 
calculations: 
 BE4 Electrical failure could be: 
1. Rationing plan and/or 
2. Failures in the power system. 
In this town, daily rationing plan in general estimated by 2, 4 or 6 hours/day, it may be 
changed according to the seasons or location. 
 BE8 Storage unit failure helps and encourages customers to store as much water as 
they can NOT as they need, it is not temporal (it doesn‟t change with time). 
We can estimate the value  (   ) by making questionnaire about the household 
storage systems in the town. 
I analyzed daily data for 18 months, some of them were missed so I employed Monte Carlo 
method to generate random values of studied variables, the used probabilities distribution in 
the study were Normal distribution for (Supply values, demand values) and Bernoulli for 
(technical failure, electrical failure). 
The full calculations of the case study exist on a CD, it is available upon request. 
As an example of calculations, I present the following tables of BE1 
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Table 22   Part table of MTBF and average t calculation and the outputs 
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Table 23   Probabilities values of the Basic Events according to CRAM 
 
 
Fig. 33 Basic events probabilities by CRAM 
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Fig. 34 Fault tree calculation under CRAM using Equ.30 
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Table 24   P(top) and risk level calculations under CRAM 
 
Apply the equation Equ.32, 
 (   )    ,(   (   )) (  , (   )  (   )-) (   (   )) (  , (   )  (   )-) ( 
  (   )) (   (   )- 
 (   )    ,(       ) (  ,           -) (       ) (  ,           -) ( 
      ) (       - 
 (   )   0.296 
To calculate risk level, Ci is the number of all consumers affected 
Since it is not meaningful to estimate the number of people affected for the top event in the 
fault tree, it was estimated at a lower level for n different main types of minimal cut sets, 
Equ.42 
  (          )  (          )  (          )  (          )  (          )
 (           ) 
       min  
That means 38 hours and 7 minutes during the year each consumer will have an interruption 
supply because of Low pressure problem, and if we consider 8 supply hours per day that 
means 4.8 days without water for each average consumer per year. 
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4.2.2 Simple Methodology outputs 
Data process under SRAM is mentioned in section 3.4.3.2, as an example of the calculations 
I present the following table of BE1 
Table 25   Data sources assumptions 
 
 
 
Table 26   Calculations and outputs with DS theory 
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Table 27   Belief, estimate value and Plausibility of the basic events 
 
 
Fig. 35 Belief, estimate value and Plausibility of the basic events 
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Fig. 36 Fault tree calculation under SRAM using Equ.30 
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Table 28   P(top) and risk level calculations under SRAM 
 
Apply the equation Equ.32, 
 (   )    ,(   (   )) (  , (   )  (   )-) (   (   )) (  , (   )  (   )-) ( 
  (   )) (   (   )- 
 
 (   )    ,(     (   )) (  ,   (   )    (   )-) (     (   )) ( 
 ,   (   )    (   )-) (     (   )) (     (   )- 
 
 (   )    ,(       ) (  ,           -) (       ) (  ,           -) ( 
      ) (       - 
 (   )         
Probability of failure represents the proportion of time the system is in failure mode for 
example, the expected number of days per year at least one consumer is exposed to 
quantity or quality failure 
To calculate risk level, Ci is the number of all consumers affected. 
Since it is not meaningful to estimate the number of people affected for the top event in the 
fault tree, it was estimated at a lower level for n different main types of minimal cut sets, 
Equ.42 
  (           )  (            )  (           )  (           )
 (           )  (            ) 
       min 
That means 43 hours and 28 minutes during the year each consumer will have an 
interruption supply because of Low pressure problem, and if we consider 8 supply hours per 
day that means 5.4 days without water for each average consumer per year  
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 Results and discussions  4.3
Simple methodology gives higher output values than Complex one because mi(Y,N) has 
high effect on the final result 
Fig. 37 Comparison between SM and CM results 
 
To have more accurate results when implementing DS theory, I suggest the experts to 
assume mi(N)> 80% 
The results show that the difference between Complex and Simple is about 321 minutes per 
year, and error is 6      , extra 6 hours of failure for each 10000 hours of study, SRAM 
gives higher output values than CRAM one. 
Risk reduction options for this case study: 
 Budget allocation for pumping system maintenance and repair programs. 
 Budget allocation for water resources management projects to find additional 
resources: Surface water, underground water or to treat or desalinate available water 
 Water resources allocation 
 Emergency response plan to any failure in existing pumping system, reservoir, 
treatment plants, and distribution system 
 Redundancy pumping system 
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 Reduce and control water losses by applying efficient strategies to detect leaks and 
take speed and efficient reactions as speed repairs or replacement of damage part 
and control illegal penetrate to the system 
 Control households tanks and pumps: Monitor storage tanks‟ volumes and pumps 
characteristics 
 Increase the duration of supply to decrease the withdraw rate, increase the hydraulic 
capacity of the network and to affect consumers behaviors 
 Redundancy electrical power supply: Find alternative electrical power sources 
 Regular maintenance and flushing program: Clear and regular inspection, 
maintenance, repair, cleaning and flushing plans should be set to the equipment and 
pipelines. 
 Public awareness programs 
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 5 CONCLUSION 
 The findings and results of the project 5.1
Nowadays, IWS strategy is widely prevailed in developing countries especially in the Middle 
East. Its unique hydraulic behavior, its supply pattern, and the period and frequency of 
supply make IWS systems full with deviations from the designed operating conditions. 
The study outputs are presented in UEs catalogue list and Risk Analysis Methodology. 
Many undesired events in the developed list are in common between continuous and 
intermittent water supply systems, but with difference causes, consequences, and criteria of 
probability 
Risk Analysis Methodology for IWS system was proposed in this study, the generic 
framework Fig.22 
Two different cases of probability analysis procedure were built up to estimate BEs 
probabilities under uncertainty, one gives out acceptable accurate values of outputs by using 
available hard data and employing Monte Carlo simulation and the other gives out an 
indication of risk level of the system by using DS Theory which could be useful in developing 
countries conditions where no available records or data for adequate number of years exists. 
The study confirmed that an IWS system has unstable hydraulic conditions: 
 The distribution network is not fully pressurized pipeline network but a network with 
very low pressures,  
 It is a network with restricted water supply hours per day,  
 Inequitable distribution of the available water, 
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 Thousands of roof tank connections,  
 In case of fire, unavailable immediate supply. 
 Inconvenience to consumers. 
The main characteristics of proposed methodology: 
 Applicable and easy to implement 
 Adaptable with any kind of IWS system and open for any modifications or changes in 
system conditions 
 Support decision making system, and suggest applicable risk reduction options and 
strategies 
 Distinguish between simple and complex probability analysis procedures 
 Uncertainty of the inputs is a measure of accuracy of the outputs 
 It may give outputs with acceptable accuracy (CRAM) or it may give indication of the 
risk level of the system (SRAM) 
 The proposed methodology implemented on a simulated IWS system case study. 
HAZOP technique was a good choice to build up the UEs list because it is: 
 Effective and clear,  
 Comprehensive 
 Flexible 
 A perfect tool to manage and arrange the team work step by step  
 Exploring almost all possible deviations and problems that may occur in the system 
 Employing HAZID (HAZard Identification) techniques such as Brainstorming, 
checklist and what- if analysis under schematic productive plan. 
HAZOP documents take into account the supposed IWS system, in other case study some 
modifications should be taken into account: 
 The study nodes: we may change or add new study node according to the available 
reading nodes for the water company that we can take required data  
 The parameters: we may add or delete some parameters according to the available 
data in the company 
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 The guide words in the tables: we may add more guide words or use other criteria to 
determine the deviations of the system from standard operating conditions. 
 Even if we relied on the same study nodes and tables, the causes, undesired events 
or the responses may be changed according to the real situation in studied system 
Risk level was estimated by using FTA technique in terms of CML Customers Minutes Lost, 
Equ.42 
FTA technique was used to estimate the probabilities of occurrence and consequences and 
then to estimate risk levels. 
FTA and HAZOP are the best PHA combination of techniques to identify hazards and 
evaluate their impacts. 
The solutions are always depending on the economic situations of the countries, if the 
country doesn‟t have enough budget to treat withdraw water from other sources or manage 
water loss, so it‟s necessary to look for technical solutions to manage and optimize the 
existing water source and networks, and control water demand by set higher tariff and 
billing,.  
Low pressure in IWS systems has high effect on the other problems, it causes meter 
malfunctioning, failure in firefighting systems, water contamination and it forces the 
consumers to use individual household pumping systems to be able to reach the water 
during supply period. 
 Recommendations for future research 5.2
The study is considered the first step in risk analysis for IWS systems field which many other 
studies may branch out from it. 
Comparison between different existing types of IWS system should be carried out to achieve 
more UEs by applying HAZOP. 
The rest of UEs from the catalogue need to be analyzed to estimate the risk levels 
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